System boundary
Determine where untrusted prompts, retrieved content, model output and tool results cross application and authorization boundaries.
AI assurance for product decisions
The right AI security test depends on what the system can read, decide and do. We map the application, model, retrieval sources, tools, identities and data boundary, then confirm which workstreams are technically supportable. Testing prioritizes paths to unauthorized data access, cross-user impact, unsafe actions and control bypass.
Decision firstScope the question and relying audience
Safe authorizationSet access, exclusions and stop conditions
Validated evidenceSeparate facts, impact and uncertainty
Owned next moveRemediate, retest or accept explicitly
The buyer decision
A chatbot over public documentation, a tenant-aware RAG assistant and an autonomous operations agent do not present the same risk. A useful engagement begins by separating ordinary application flaws from model-mediated behavior, retrieval trust, tool authority and provider dependencies. That prevents a superficial prompt-injection exercise from being presented as full product assurance.
This page is the commercial entry point for selecting the correct AI testing workstream. Depending on architecture, the scope may combine end-to-end AI application penetration testing, LLM boundary assessment, RAG and agent testing, API testing, cloud review or source analysis. Unsupported models, inaccessible provider controls and evaluation-only objectives are identified before the proposal is finalized.
Determine where untrusted prompts, retrieved content, model output and tool results cross application and authorization boundaries.
Prioritize whether AI behavior can expose protected data, act across users or tenants, misuse tools, change records or bypass approvals.
Select application, LLM, RAG, agent, API, cloud or code coverage based on the deployed architecture—not a keyword checklist.
State stochastic behavior, provider limitations, inaccessible components and evaluation gaps separately from validated vulnerabilities.
Assessment coverage
Final coverage is capability-dependent and confirmed during scoping. These workstreams are selected, not automatically promised as one universal test.
Application identity, sessions and tenant authorization
Direct and indirect prompt injection paths
System prompts, policy layers and instruction hierarchy
RAG ingestion, retrieval authorization and source trust
Agents, plugins, functions and tool permission boundaries
Sensitive-data exposure through prompts, output and logs
Model and provider API configuration and key handling
Rate, cost, abuse monitoring and human approval controls
Risk paths
We test whether a behavior crosses a security boundary. Unexpected text alone is not automatically a vulnerability; exploitability, reach and consequence matter.
Place controlled instructions in retrieved or connected content and test whether they override the intended workflow.
Assess whether tools expose more functions, permissions or autonomy than the task requires and whether high-impact actions need approval.
Challenge retrieval filters, conversation state, caches and application authorization with controlled identities and documents.
Test whether prompts, errors, logs, model context or connected sources reveal protected data beyond authorization.
Probe how model-generated parameters are validated before files, APIs, databases or workflows are invoked.
Determine whether downstream rendering or execution turns model output into injection or unauthorized action.
Review exposed keys, quotas, model routing, fine-tune access and controls that limit financial or operational misuse.
Combine ordinary application flaws with AI behavior to evaluate the full path to material impact.
Scope architecture
Scoping routes the system to the depth that matches its architecture and the evidence a buyer or risk owner actually needs.
| System pattern | Primary security question | Likely workstream |
|---|---|---|
| AI feature inside a SaaS product | Can identity, API, model and data controls be chained into cross-user or product impact? | AI application penetration testing with web and API coverage |
| Hosted LLM endpoint or gateway | Are model-facing inputs, outputs, keys, policies and usage boundaries resistant to abuse? | LLM security assessment |
| RAG assistant | Can ingestion or retrieval cross authorization, trust unsafe content or expose protected sources? | RAG security testing plus tenant isolation where relevant |
| Tool-using agent | Can untrusted content cause actions outside intended permissions, approval or business rules? | AI agent and tool security testing |
| Early design or evaluation | What threats and controls should shape architecture before a testable build exists? | Threat modeling or AI risk workshop, not a penetration-test claim |
Delivery process
Every phase preserves scope, authorization, evidence quality and a practical path to closure.
Confirm the model or provider, system interfaces, agent framework, accessible environments, data sensitivity, permitted test methods and required specialist coverage.
Map instructions, identities, retrieval sources, tools, data stores, output consumers, human approvals and provider dependencies.
Use seeded content, controlled users and safe tool targets. Reproduce material behaviors and distinguish deterministic control failures from variable model output.
Document the tested build and conditions, validated impact, reproducibility, provider limitations, untested evaluations and practical product-level controls.
Deliverables
Deliverables are tailored to the agreed audience. Technical evidence remains access-controlled; summaries keep the tested scope, date and limitations attached.
AI system and data-flow attack-surface map
Selected workstream and coverage rationale
Validated findings tied to application impact
Controlled prompt, retrieval and tool evidence
Determinism and reproducibility notes
Product, model and provider control recommendations
Explicit untested components and uncertainty register
Retest status for agreed material fixes
Service fit
Evidence boundaries
Generative systems can produce variable results, and provider behavior may change outside the application owner’s release cycle. We record model and build details, test conditions, repeatability and access limits. A finding must show a meaningful control failure or credible impact; a surprising output is not inflated into a security claim.
OWASP LLM risk categories and the NIST Generative AI Profile inform threat coverage, but neither is used as a certification label. Testing cannot guarantee every future model response, eliminate all misuse or replace governance, privacy review, safety evaluation and continuous monitoring. Model and provider support is confirmed during scoping.
Common questions
Coverage is selected after architecture review. It can include application and API authorization, prompt injection, retrieval controls, agent tools, output handling, provider configuration and data exposure. We do not claim every workstream for every product; the final proposal names supported models, interfaces, environments and exclusions.
Not automatically. We evaluate whether the behavior crosses a trust boundary or creates credible confidentiality, integrity, availability, financial or operational impact. The report distinguishes expected model limitations, defense-in-depth opportunities and reproducible security findings.
Potentially, yes. We first confirm the framework, model access, retrieval design, tool permissions, safe test environment and required expertise. RAG and agents usually need controlled documents, accounts and tool targets so cross-user access or unsafe actions can be demonstrated without harming real data.
The report, scope statement and optional assurance summary can support customer review with concrete evidence and limitations. It is not a certification, model guarantee or substitute for your governance documentation. We can align the deliverable audience during scoping.
Share the product purpose, model or provider, deployment stage, data types, user and tenant roles, retrieval sources, tools, high-impact actions and decision deadline. Do not send prompts containing customer data, API keys or credentials until NDA and secure transfer are agreed.
Related services
Next step
Share the decision, systems, important roles or environments, access constraints and deadline. Begin without credentials or protected evidence; NDA and secure transfer can be agreed before sensitive material is exchanged.