AI assurance for product decisions

AI and LLM penetration testing tied to exploitable product impact—not prompt tricks

The right AI security test depends on what the system can read, decide and do. We map the application, model, retrieval sources, tools, identities and data boundary, then confirm which workstreams are technically supportable. Testing prioritizes paths to unauthorized data access, cross-user impact, unsafe actions and control bypass.

  • Capability-gated scope
  • Impact-led testing
  • Controlled AI evidence
01

Decision firstScope the question and relying audience

02

Safe authorizationSet access, exclusions and stop conditions

03

Validated evidenceSeparate facts, impact and uncertainty

04

Owned next moveRemediate, retest or accept explicitly

The buyer decision

Which AI-specific workstream matches the system and business decision?

A chatbot over public documentation, a tenant-aware RAG assistant and an autonomous operations agent do not present the same risk. A useful engagement begins by separating ordinary application flaws from model-mediated behavior, retrieval trust, tool authority and provider dependencies. That prevents a superficial prompt-injection exercise from being presented as full product assurance.

This page is the commercial entry point for selecting the correct AI testing workstream. Depending on architecture, the scope may combine end-to-end AI application penetration testing, LLM boundary assessment, RAG and agent testing, API testing, cloud review or source analysis. Unsupported models, inaccessible provider controls and evaluation-only objectives are identified before the proposal is finalized.

System boundary

Determine where untrusted prompts, retrieved content, model output and tool results cross application and authorization boundaries.

Material impact

Prioritize whether AI behavior can expose protected data, act across users or tenants, misuse tools, change records or bypass approvals.

Appropriate workstream

Select application, LLM, RAG, agent, API, cloud or code coverage based on the deployed architecture—not a keyword checklist.

Residual uncertainty

State stochastic behavior, provider limitations, inaccessible components and evaluation gaps separately from validated vulnerabilities.

Assessment coverage

Build coverage around what the AI system can access and change

Final coverage is capability-dependent and confirmed during scoping. These workstreams are selected, not automatically promised as one universal test.

Application identity, sessions and tenant authorization

Direct and indirect prompt injection paths

System prompts, policy layers and instruction hierarchy

RAG ingestion, retrieval authorization and source trust

Agents, plugins, functions and tool permission boundaries

Sensitive-data exposure through prompts, output and logs

Model and provider API configuration and key handling

Rate, cost, abuse monitoring and human approval controls

Risk paths

Move from model behavior to validated business impact

We test whether a behavior crosses a security boundary. Unexpected text alone is not automatically a vulnerability; exploitability, reach and consequence matter.

Indirect prompt injection

Place controlled instructions in retrieved or connected content and test whether they override the intended workflow.

Excessive agency

Assess whether tools expose more functions, permissions or autonomy than the task requires and whether high-impact actions need approval.

Cross-user or tenant leakage

Challenge retrieval filters, conversation state, caches and application authorization with controlled identities and documents.

Sensitive information disclosure

Test whether prompts, errors, logs, model context or connected sources reveal protected data beyond authorization.

Tool argument manipulation

Probe how model-generated parameters are validated before files, APIs, databases or workflows are invoked.

Insecure output handling

Determine whether downstream rendering or execution turns model output into injection or unauthorized action.

Model or provider abuse

Review exposed keys, quotas, model routing, fine-tune access and controls that limit financial or operational misuse.

Control bypass chains

Combine ordinary application flaws with AI behavior to evaluate the full path to material impact.

Scope architecture

Choose the right AI testing workstream

Scoping routes the system to the depth that matches its architecture and the evidence a buyer or risk owner actually needs.

System patternPrimary security questionLikely workstream
AI feature inside a SaaS productCan identity, API, model and data controls be chained into cross-user or product impact?AI application penetration testing with web and API coverage
Hosted LLM endpoint or gatewayAre model-facing inputs, outputs, keys, policies and usage boundaries resistant to abuse?LLM security assessment
RAG assistantCan ingestion or retrieval cross authorization, trust unsafe content or expose protected sources?RAG security testing plus tenant isolation where relevant
Tool-using agentCan untrusted content cause actions outside intended permissions, approval or business rules?AI agent and tool security testing
Early design or evaluationWhat threats and controls should shape architecture before a testable build exists?Threat modeling or AI risk workshop, not a penetration-test claim

Delivery process

From first brief to decision-ready evidence

Every phase preserves scope, authorization, evidence quality and a practical path to closure.

  1. 01

    Qualify the capability

    Confirm the model or provider, system interfaces, agent framework, accessible environments, data sensitivity, permitted test methods and required specialist coverage.

  2. 02

    Model the AI trust boundary

    Map instructions, identities, retrieval sources, tools, data stores, output consumers, human approvals and provider dependencies.

  3. 03

    Test controlled impact paths

    Use seeded content, controlled users and safe tool targets. Reproduce material behaviors and distinguish deterministic control failures from variable model output.

  4. 04

    Report facts and uncertainty

    Document the tested build and conditions, validated impact, reproducibility, provider limitations, untested evaluations and practical product-level controls.

Deliverables

Outputs built for executives, security owners and implementers

Deliverables are tailored to the agreed audience. Technical evidence remains access-controlled; summaries keep the tested scope, date and limitations attached.

AI system and data-flow attack-surface map

Selected workstream and coverage rationale

Validated findings tied to application impact

Controlled prompt, retrieval and tool evidence

Determinism and reproducibility notes

Product, model and provider control recommendations

Explicit untested components and uncertainty register

Retest status for agreed material fixes

Service fit

Choose the engagement that answers the actual question

Strong fit

This service is designed for you when:

  • An AI-enabled product handles private, tenant or regulated data.
  • An LLM can call tools, update records or influence material decisions.
  • Enterprise customers need credible technical assurance before adoption.
  • The team can provide a testable build, controlled identities and representative data paths.
Choose a different path

Another service may be more useful when:

  • Choose AI threat modeling when the system is still at architecture stage and there is no testable implementation.
  • Choose an AI governance or risk-management engagement when the central decision is policy, accountability or lifecycle oversight rather than exploit validation.
  • A standalone model safety evaluation, bias study or red-team program may require different datasets, expertise and success criteria; capability must be separately confirmed.

Evidence boundaries

AI testing needs stronger scope language, not stronger promises

Generative systems can produce variable results, and provider behavior may change outside the application owner’s release cycle. We record model and build details, test conditions, repeatability and access limits. A finding must show a meaningful control failure or credible impact; a surprising output is not inflated into a security claim.

OWASP LLM risk categories and the NIST Generative AI Profile inform threat coverage, but neither is used as a certification label. Testing cannot guarantee every future model response, eliminate all misuse or replace governance, privacy review, safety evaluation and continuous monitoring. Model and provider support is confirmed during scoping.

Common questions

Questions buyers ask before scoping

What is included in AI and LLM penetration testing?

Coverage is selected after architecture review. It can include application and API authorization, prompt injection, retrieval controls, agent tools, output handling, provider configuration and data exposure. We do not claim every workstream for every product; the final proposal names supported models, interfaces, environments and exclusions.

Is prompt injection alone considered a vulnerability?

Not automatically. We evaluate whether the behavior crosses a trust boundary or creates credible confidentiality, integrity, availability, financial or operational impact. The report distinguishes expected model limitations, defense-in-depth opportunities and reproducible security findings.

Can you test our RAG system or autonomous agent?

Potentially, yes. We first confirm the framework, model access, retrieval design, tool permissions, safe test environment and required expertise. RAG and agents usually need controlled documents, accounts and tool targets so cross-user access or unsafe actions can be demonstrated without harming real data.

Will this satisfy enterprise customer questions?

The report, scope statement and optional assurance summary can support customer review with concrete evidence and limitations. It is not a certification, model guarantee or substitute for your governance documentation. We can align the deliverable audience during scoping.

What information should we send first?

Share the product purpose, model or provider, deployment stage, data types, user and tenant roles, retrieval sources, tools, high-impact actions and decision deadline. Do not send prompts containing customer data, API keys or credentials until NDA and secure transfer are agreed.

Next step

Turn the requirement into a clear, defensible scope

Share the decision, systems, important roles or environments, access constraints and deadline. Begin without credentials or protected evidence; NDA and secure transfer can be agreed before sensitive material is exchanged.

  1. 01Describe the decision
  2. 02Confirm scope and safety
  3. 03Receive clear commercial terms
Build a Scope