Software delivery chain assurance

Find the shortest path from a code contribution to your build secrets, artifacts or production cloud

A CI/CD pipeline joins source control, workflow logic, third-party actions, runners, credentials, artifact stores, registries and deployment identities into one high-trust system. We model that chain and test whether an untrusted contribution, compromised account or poisoned dependency can cross its approval boundaries.

  • Pipeline attack paths
  • Safe proof of impact
  • Developer-ready fixes
01

Decision firstScope the question and relying audience

02

Safe authorizationSet access, exclusions and stop conditions

03

Validated evidenceSeparate facts, impact and uncertainty

04

Owned next moveRemediate, retest or accept explicitly

The buyer decision

Can a low-trust change become a high-trust execution or deployment?

Pipeline risk is not limited to a leaked secret in a YAML file. The material question is whether the system lets untrusted code reach a privileged runner, persist in a cache, influence a reusable workflow, obtain a cloud token, alter an artifact or bypass an environment approval. We trace those transitions across the whole delivery chain.

This assessment is useful after rapid DevOps growth, a move to cloud identity federation, adoption of self-hosted runners, new release signing, a supply-chain incident or an enterprise assurance request. Findings name the attacker prerequisite, trust transition, reachable asset and recommended control owner rather than producing a generic hardening list.

Execution boundary

Determine which pull requests, forks, branches, dependencies and workflow inputs can cause code to execute on privileged infrastructure.

Credential boundary

Validate whether jobs receive only the secrets and cloud permissions required for their specific stage and trust level.

Artifact integrity

Assess whether builds, packages, images, caches and attestations can be replaced or promoted without the intended review.

Governance resilience

Review branch rules, environment approvals, workflow ownership and audit trails for bypass and fragile exceptions.

Assessment coverage

Assess the pipeline from source event to production identity

Coverage follows the actual platform—such as GitHub Actions, GitLab CI/CD, Azure Pipelines, Jenkins or another authorized system—without assuming identical control names.

Repository roles, branch protections and review rules

Workflow definitions, reusable components and triggers

Hosted and self-hosted runner isolation

Secrets, variables and cloud workload identity federation

Third-party actions, plugins and dependency trust

Build caches, artifacts, packages and container registries

Environment approvals, deployments and rollback paths

Logging, provenance, signing and incident investigation readiness

Risk paths

Test the trust transitions attackers target

OWASP describes poisoned pipeline execution as manipulation of build or deployment configuration to execute malicious commands. We include that path and the surrounding controls that determine its impact.

Poisoned pipeline execution

Assess whether an attacker able to influence source or workflow content can execute in a higher-trust job or runner.

Untrusted pull request exposure

Test whether fork or pull-request events receive secrets, writable tokens, caches or access to persistent infrastructure.

Workflow and action substitution

Review mutable references, reusable workflow trust, plugin updates and repository transfers for execution hijack.

Runner persistence

Evaluate isolation, cleanup and network reachability where a job could affect later jobs or internal systems.

Cloud identity escalation

Map OIDC claims, audience, subject conditions and role permissions from pipeline job to cloud impact.

Artifact replacement

Challenge upload, promotion, registry and deployment controls that bind reviewed source to released output.

Approval bypass

Look for alternate branches, manual jobs, inherited permissions or administrators that circumvent intended separation.

Evidence suppression

Assess log retention and audit coverage for workflow changes, secret access, artifact mutation and deployment actions.

Scope architecture

Connect each trust level to its reachable assets

The resulting model makes remediation easier because owners can see which single control breaks an entire attack chain.

Trust transitionRepresentative questionsPrimary evidence
Contributor to workflowCan a fork, pull request or low-privilege maintainer change code that executes with repository or organization trust?Trigger logic, workflow ownership and branch rules
Workflow to runnerDoes untrusted code reach a persistent or network-privileged runner, and is state removed between jobs?Runner groups, labels, network paths and cleanup model
Job to credentialAre repository tokens, secrets and federated cloud roles constrained by event, environment, branch and job?Permissions, secret scopes and identity claims
Build to artifactHow is a reviewed commit bound to packages, images, signatures and promotion?Artifact metadata, registry roles and release controls
Artifact to productionCan deployment approval, environment protection or rollback be bypassed or invoked with altered output?Environment rules, deploy identities and audit events

Delivery process

From first brief to decision-ready evidence

Every phase preserves scope, authorization, evidence quality and a practical path to closure.

  1. 01

    Model events and trust

    Inventory repositories, triggers, shared workflows, runners, credentials, artifact stores and deployment environments. Classify who can influence each stage.

  2. 02

    Review effective configuration

    Inspect approved workflow and platform evidence for dangerous triggers, excessive permissions, mutable dependencies and control exceptions.

  3. 03

    Validate safely

    Use test repositories, non-production environments or inert proof where possible. Never publish or deploy malicious output merely to demonstrate theoretical impact.

  4. 04

    Break the attack chain

    Prioritize changes that remove high-trust execution, narrow credentials, isolate runners and bind artifacts to approved source. Provide retest cases.

Deliverables

Outputs built for executives, security owners and implementers

Deliverables are tailored to the agreed audience. Technical evidence remains access-controlled; summaries keep the tested scope, date and limitations attached.

CI/CD architecture and trust-transition map

Repository, workflow, runner and identity inventory

Validated attack paths with safe evidence

Secrets and permission exposure analysis

Artifact integrity and promotion observations

Platform-specific remediation actions

Control-owner and priority mapping

Retest results for material corrections

Service fit

Choose the engagement that answers the actual question

Strong fit

This service is designed for you when:

  • A delivery platform controls production releases or sensitive cloud identities.
  • Self-hosted runners or reusable workflows serve several teams.
  • The organization is moving from stored cloud keys to workload identity federation.
  • Customers or auditors need technical evidence about software delivery controls.
Choose a different path

Another service may be more useful when:

  • Choose source code review when the primary question is product implementation rather than delivery trust.
  • Choose a cloud security assessment when pipeline identity is only one part of broader account posture.
  • Choose incident response when pipeline or source-control compromise is suspected; preservation and containment take priority over routine assessment.

Evidence boundaries

Safe validation without turning the test into a supply-chain event

We agree in advance whether validation uses a test repository, disposable runner, non-production environment or an inert production-safe proof. The standard assessment does not deploy malicious code, alter a customer release, extract unnecessary secrets or weaken branch controls. Any exception needs explicit authorization and rollback planning.

OWASP CI/CD guidance and the NIST Secure Software Development Framework inform coverage, but the engagement is neither an OWASP certification nor an SSDF conformity assessment. The report reflects the repositories, workflows, runners, identities and artifact paths available during the agreed window.

Common questions

Questions buyers ask before scoping

Which CI/CD platforms can be assessed?

We scope around the delivery architecture rather than one brand. Common environments include GitHub Actions, GitLab CI/CD, Azure Pipelines and Jenkins, along with artifact registries and cloud deployment identities. Capability and required access are confirmed before commercial commitment.

Will you run malicious code in our production pipeline?

No, not as a default method. We prefer test repositories, isolated runners, non-production stages or inert evidence. Any validation that could change an artifact or deployment requires explicit authorization, defined rollback, monitoring and a clear reason the safer alternative is insufficient.

Do you review secrets and cloud OIDC federation?

Yes, when included in scope. We examine where secrets are available, how tokens are minted, which claims constrain workload identity and what cloud permissions the job receives. Sensitive values are minimized in evidence and should never be sent through the public form.

Is this the same as a source code review?

No. Source code review focuses on the security of application implementation. A CI/CD assessment focuses on the trust system that builds, signs, stores and deploys that code. The two can be combined when custom pipeline tooling or release-critical code also needs review.

What do you need to quote the work?

Share the pipeline platforms, approximate repository count, runner model, artifact and registry services, deployment clouds, use of reusable workflows and decision deadline. A high-level diagram is helpful; detailed configuration and credentials can wait for NDA and secure evidence transfer.

Next step

Turn the requirement into a clear, defensible scope

Share the decision, systems, important roles or environments, access constraints and deadline. Begin without credentials or protected evidence; NDA and secure transfer can be agreed before sensitive material is exchanged.

  1. 01Describe the decision
  2. 02Confirm scope and safety
  3. 03Receive clear commercial terms
Build a Scope